invidia

1. Odium and invidia denote the feeling of aversion; inimicitia and simultas, the exterior state arising from this feeling. 2. Invidia has a negative character, like disaffection, like δύσνοια, and is a temporary feeling, in opp. to gratia or favor; whereas odium (from ὀδύσασθαι) has a character thoroughly positive, like hatred, μῖσος, and is a deep-rooted feeling, in opp. to amor. Plin. Pan. 68, 7. Hence, invidia is the beginning of odium. Invidia has merely persons; odium, persons and things for its objects. Tac. Ann. ii. 56. Armenii . . . sæpius discordes sunt, adversus Romanos odio, et in Parthum invidia. xiii. 15. Nero intellecta invidia odium intendit. Plin. Pan. 84, 2. Exardescit invidia, cujus finis est odium. 3. Inimicitia denotes any enmity which has its foundation in antipathy or disagreement, like δυσμένεια, ἔχθρα; whereas simultas (ὁμαλότης) denotes a political enmity, which has its foundation in rivalship, like φιλονεικία. Suet. Vesp. 6. Simultas quam ex æmulatione non obscuræ gerebant. (iii. 73.)

Invidia denotes looking askance, as a sign that a man grudges something to another, from moral or immoral motives, not necessarily, though especially, from self-love, like ὑποψία; whereas livor (from χλεύη, or χλοιά), denotes the self-tormenting envy, which poisons the whole soul, and deprives the body itself of its fresh healthy color. 2. Invidia is the usual term for envy, whether active, as that which a man harbors, or passive, as a state in which a man stands; whereas invidentia is a new term of Cicero’s for the envy which a man harbors. 3. Invidia and livor denote envy as a temporary state, whereas malignitas as an habitual quality and disposition, in opp. to goodness of heart. The invidus and lividus grudge particular persons particular advantages, in particular cases; but the malignus wishes well to nobody but himself. 4. Invidia, livor, malignitas, denote a feeling and state of mind, whereas obtrectatio denotes an action, or manner of acting, proceeding from this feeling, inasmuch as it seeks to injure the envied person by dishonorable means, namely, detraction. Obtrectatio can scarcely be conceived as existing without invidia, but invidia may without obtrectatio, if the envious person is too cowardly to enter into conflict with the envied. 5. Obtrectatio supposes a rival, and has its origin in jealousy; whereas detrectatio only an enemy in general, and proceeds principally from antipathy. (iii. 65.)